R’ Akiva asked them further: [If] one slaughters five offerings outside [the Temple] in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one [chatas] for all of them or one for each? They replied to him: [This] we have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that one who eats of one offering in five dishes in one lapse of awareness is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Shimon: R’ Akiva did not ask them about such a case, rather if one ate leftover of five offerings in one lapse of awareness — what is [he liable for]? Is he liable to one for all of them or one for each one? They replied to him: We have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that if one eats from one offering in five dishes, he is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Akiva: If [this is] an accepted halachah, we will accept [it], but if [it is] a logical deduction, there is a refutation. He said to him: Refute [it]. He replied to him: No, if you say [that] in the case of me’ilah, in which [the Torah] made the one who gives to eat as though he were eating, and the one who bestows benefit as though he were receiving benefit, [and the Torah] reckoned together the me’ilah over a long period of time, can you say [the same] regarding the case of the leftover offering, which has none of these [stringencies]?

Said R’ Akiva: I asked R’ Eliezer: [If] one per- forms many labors on many Sabbaths of the same type of work in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one for all of them or to one for each one? He replied to me: He is liable for each one from a kal vachomer. Now, if [for] a menstruous woman, [a prohibition] which has no numerous classifications or many ways of being liable to a chatas, he is liable for each one, [does it not follow that for] the Sabbath, which has numerous classifications and many ways of being liable to a chatas, that he should be liable for each one? I replied to him: No, if you say this in regard to the menstruant, it is because two prohibitions are involved — for he is prohibited from being intimate with the menstruant, and the menstruant is prohibited from being intimate with him — can you say the same regarding the Sabbath, in which only one prohibition is involved? He replied: The case of one who cohabits with minors will prove [this ruling], for they have only one prohibition, yet he is liable for each one. I replied to him: No, if you state this ruling regarding one who cohabits with minors, which, although there is no prohibition now, there is one later, can you state it regarding the Sabbath, which neither now nor later has [separate chataos]? He replied to me: The case of one intimate with an animal will prove [it]. I replied to him: [Indeed, the case concerning] the animal is like [the case of the] Sabbath.