[If] they said to him: ‘‘You ate forbidden fat,’’ he brings a chatas. [If] a witness says: ‘‘He ate,’’ and [another] witness says: ‘‘He did not eat,’’ [or if] a woman says: ‘‘He ate,’’ and [another] woman says: ‘‘He did not eat,’’ he must bring an asham talui. [If] a witness says: ‘‘He ate,’’ and he says: ‘‘I did not eat,’’ he is exempt. [If] two say: ‘‘He ate,’’ and he says: ‘‘I did not eat,’’ R’ Meir declares him liable. Said R’ Meir: If two can bring him to the more severe death penalty, can they not bring him to the lighter penalty of an offering? They said to him: What if he would want to say: ‘‘I was an intentional transgressor!’’?

[If] he ate two portions of cheilev in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to only one chatas. [But] if he ate cheilev, blood, leftover offerings, and piggul in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each one. In this, many kinds are more stringent than one kind. But [in the following], one kind is more stringent than many kinds: If he ate half an olive’s bulk, and again ate half an olive’s bulk — [if they were] of one kind, he is liable; of two kinds, he is exempt.

And how much time may it take for him to eat them? As if he would eat them as parched grains of corn; [these are] the words of R’ Meir. But the Sages say: Until it takes no more from the beginning to the end than it would take to eat a peras. [If] he ate tamei foodstuffs or drank tamei beverages, or if he drank a reviis of wine and entered the Temple and tarried [in their consumption] for as long as it takes to eat a peras [he is liable]. R’ Eliezer says: If he interrupted, or if he diluted it with the least bit of water, he is exempt.

There is [an instance of] one who performs one act of eating and is liable for it to four chataos and one asham: a tamei [person] who ate cheilev, which was leftover from consecrated food, and [it was] on Yom Kippur. R’ Meir says: If it was the Sabbath and he carried it out in his mouth, he is [additionally] liable. They said to him: That is not in the [same] category.

There is one who performs one act of cohabitation and is liable for it to six chataos. He who cohabits with his daughter may be liable for her as his daughter, his sister, his brother’s wife, his father’s brother’s wife, a married woman, and a menstruant. And he who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter may be liable for her as his daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, his wife’s sister, his brother’s wife, his father’s brother’s wife, a married woman, and a menstruant. R’ Yose says: If the [great-]grandfather transgressed and married her, he is liable for her as his father’s wife, and so is he who cohabits with his wife’s daughter or with his wife’s daughter’s daughter.

He who cohabits with his mother-in-law may be liable for her as his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, his wife’s sister, his brother’s wife, his father’s brother’s wife, a married woman, and a menstruant. And so is he who cohabits with his motherin-law’s mother or his father-in-law’s mother. R’ Yochanan ben Nuri says: He who cohabits with his mother-in-law can be liable for her as his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him: The three of them are of one denomination.

Said R’ Akiva: I asked Rabban Gamliel and R’ Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus when they went to purchase an animal for Rabban Gamliel’s son’s feast: One who cohabits with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister, in one lapse of awareness — what is he [liable for]? Is he liable to one [chatas] for all of them or one for each? And they replied to me: [This] we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with his five menstruous wives, in a single lapse of awareness, is liable for each one, and we believe that the matter is a kal vachomer.

R’ Akiva asked them further: A dangling limb of an animal — what is it [considered]? They replied to him: [This] we have not heard, but we have heard that a dangling limb of a human is tahor, for so were the lepers in Jerusalem wont to do: He would go to a surgeon on the eve of Pesach, and [the latter would] sever it until he would leave over a barleycorn’s breadth and impale it on a thorn, and he would pull away from it. Then, that person would make his pesach [-offering] and the surgeon would make his pesach [-offering], and we believe that the matter is a kal vachomer.

R’ Akiva asked them further: [If] one slaughters five offerings outside [the Temple] in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one [chatas] for all of them or one for each? They replied to him: [This] we have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that one who eats of one offering in five dishes in one lapse of awareness is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Shimon: R’ Akiva did not ask them about such a case, rather if one ate leftover of five offerings in one lapse of awareness — what is [he liable for]? Is he liable to one for all of them or one for each one? They replied to him: We have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that if one eats from one offering in five dishes, he is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Akiva: If [this is] an accepted halachah, we will accept [it], but if [it is] a logical deduction, there is a refutation. He said to him: Refute [it]. He replied to him: No, if you say [that] in the case of me’ilah, in which [the Torah] made the one who gives to eat as though he were eating, and the one who bestows benefit as though he were receiving benefit, [and the Torah] reckoned together the me’ilah over a long period of time, can you say [the same] regarding the case of the leftover offering, which has none of these [stringencies]?

Said R’ Akiva: I asked R’ Eliezer: [If] one per- forms many labors on many Sabbaths of the same type of work in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one for all of them or to one for each one? He replied to me: He is liable for each one from a kal vachomer. Now, if [for] a menstruous woman, [a prohibition] which has no numerous classifications or many ways of being liable to a chatas, he is liable for each one, [does it not follow that for] the Sabbath, which has numerous classifications and many ways of being liable to a chatas, that he should be liable for each one? I replied to him: No, if you say this in regard to the menstruant, it is because two prohibitions are involved — for he is prohibited from being intimate with the menstruant, and the menstruant is prohibited from being intimate with him — can you say the same regarding the Sabbath, in which only one prohibition is involved? He replied: The case of one who cohabits with minors will prove [this ruling], for they have only one prohibition, yet he is liable for each one. I replied to him: No, if you state this ruling regarding one who cohabits with minors, which, although there is no prohibition now, there is one later, can you state it regarding the Sabbath, which neither now nor later has [separate chataos]? He replied to me: The case of one intimate with an animal will prove [it]. I replied to him: [Indeed, the case concerning] the animal is like [the case of the] Sabbath.