[If] the court ruled and realized that they had erred, and retracted [their ruling], whether they had already brought their atonement or whether they did not yet bring their atonement —- and he proceeded to act on their word —- R’ Shimon ex-empts [him]; but R’ Eliezer says [it is] doubtful. Which [case] is doubtful? [If] he remained at home, he is liable. [If] he went overseas, he is exempt. Said R’ Akiva: I agree in this case that he is closer to exemption than to obligation. Ben Azzai said to him: [In] what [way] is he different from one remaining at home? [R’ Akiva replied:] In that it was possible for the one re-maining at home to have heard, [while] for this one it was impossible for him to have heard.

[If] the court ruled to uproot the entire corpus [of a law] —- [for example] if they said [that] there is no niddah [prohibition] in the Torah, [or that] there is no Sabbath [prohibition] in the Torah, [or that] there is no idol worship [prohibition] in the Torah —- they are exempt. [If] they ruled to abolish part [of a law] and to retain part, they are liable. How so? [If] they said [that] there is a niddah [prohibition] in the Torah, but one who cohabits with a woman observing one day against another is exempt; [or that] there is a Sabbath [prohibition] in the Torah, but one who carries from a private domain to a public domain is exempt; [or that] there is [a prohibition on] idol worship in the Torah, but one who bows is exempt —- they are liable; as it says: and some matter will be forgotten —- some matter, but not the entire corpus.