Said R’ Akiva: I asked Rabban Gamliel and R’ Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus when they went to purchase an animal for Rabban Gamliel’s son’s feast: One who cohabits with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister, in one lapse of awareness — what is he [liable for]? Is he liable to one [chatas] for all of them or one for each? And they replied to me: [This] we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with his five menstruous wives, in a single lapse of awareness, is liable for each one, and we believe that the matter is a kal vachomer.

R’ Akiva asked them further: A dangling limb of an animal — what is it [considered]? They replied to him: [This] we have not heard, but we have heard that a dangling limb of a human is tahor, for so were the lepers in Jerusalem wont to do: He would go to a surgeon on the eve of Pesach, and [the latter would] sever it until he would leave over a barleycorn’s breadth and impale it on a thorn, and he would pull away from it. Then, that person would make his pesach [-offering] and the surgeon would make his pesach [-offering], and we believe that the matter is a kal vachomer.

R’ Akiva asked them further: [If] one slaughters five offerings outside [the Temple] in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one [chatas] for all of them or one for each? They replied to him: [This] we have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that one who eats of one offering in five dishes in one lapse of awareness is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Shimon: R’ Akiva did not ask them about such a case, rather if one ate leftover of five offerings in one lapse of awareness — what is [he liable for]? Is he liable to one for all of them or one for each one? They replied to him: We have not heard. Said R’ Yehoshua: I have heard that if one eats from one offering in five dishes, he is liable for a me’ilah offering for each one, and I believe that the matter is a kal vachomer. Said R’ Akiva: If [this is] an accepted halachah, we will accept [it], but if [it is] a logical deduction, there is a refutation. He said to him: Refute [it]. He replied to him: No, if you say [that] in the case of me’ilah, in which [the Torah] made the one who gives to eat as though he were eating, and the one who bestows benefit as though he were receiving benefit, [and the Torah] reckoned together the me’ilah over a long period of time, can you say [the same] regarding the case of the leftover offering, which has none of these [stringencies]?

Said R’ Akiva: I asked R’ Eliezer: [If] one per- forms many labors on many Sabbaths of the same type of work in one lapse of awareness — what is the ruling? Is he liable to one for all of them or to one for each one? He replied to me: He is liable for each one from a kal vachomer. Now, if [for] a menstruous woman, [a prohibition] which has no numerous classifications or many ways of being liable to a chatas, he is liable for each one, [does it not follow that for] the Sabbath, which has numerous classifications and many ways of being liable to a chatas, that he should be liable for each one? I replied to him: No, if you say this in regard to the menstruant, it is because two prohibitions are involved — for he is prohibited from being intimate with the menstruant, and the menstruant is prohibited from being intimate with him — can you say the same regarding the Sabbath, in which only one prohibition is involved? He replied: The case of one who cohabits with minors will prove [this ruling], for they have only one prohibition, yet he is liable for each one. I replied to him: No, if you state this ruling regarding one who cohabits with minors, which, although there is no prohibition now, there is one later, can you state it regarding the Sabbath, which neither now nor later has [separate chataos]? He replied to me: The case of one intimate with an animal will prove [it]. I replied to him: [Indeed, the case concerning] the animal is like [the case of the] Sabbath.

[If there is] a doubt whether one ate cheilev fat or did not eat [it]; or even if he ate [it], [if] there is [still] a doubt whether it contained the amount [required for a chatas], or whether it did not; if cheilev fat and permissible fat were before him, and he ate one of them, but it is not known which of them he ate; [or] if his wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he inadvertently cohabited with one of them, but it was not known with which one of them he inadvertently cohabited; [or] if it was either the Sabbath or a weekday and he performed labor on one of them, but it is not known on which day he did it, he must bring an asham talui.

Just as if he ate two portions of cheilev fat in one lapse of awareness he is liable to only one chatas, so when the transgression is not known he brings only one asham talui. [But] if there was awareness in the interim, just as he brings a chatas for each one, so does he bring an asham talui for each one. Just as if he ate cheilev, blood, nossar, and piggul in one period of forgetfulness, he is liable for each one, so when the transgression is not known, he must bring an asham talui for each one. [If] cheilev and nossar were before him, and he ate one of them, but it is not known which of them he ate; [or if] his menstruous wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he inadvertently cohabited with one of them, but it is not known with which one of them he inadvertently cohabited; [or if] the Sabbath and Yom Kippur [followed one another], and he performed labor at twilight, but it is not known on which of them he performed [labor] — R’ Eliezer holds [him] liable to a chatas, but R’ Yehoshua exempts [him]. Said R’ Yose: They did not disagree that one who performed labor at twilight is exempt, for I may say that he did part of the labor today and part of it tomorrow. Concerning what did they differ? Concerning one who performed [labor] in the middle of the day, but it is not known whether he did it on the Sabbath or on Yom Kippur, or concerning one who performed [labor], but it is not known what type of labor he did. R’ Eliezer holds [him] liable to a chatas, but R’ Yehoshua exempts [him]. Said R’ Yehudah: R’ Yehoshua exempted him even from an asham talui.

R’ Shimon Shizuri and R’ Shimon say: They did not disagree that concerning anything of one category he is liable. Concerning what do they differ? Concerning something of two categories, that R’ Eliezer holds [him] liable to a chatas, and R’ Yehoshua exempts [him]. Said R’ Yehudah: Even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, [to pick] grapes and he picked figs, [to pick] black ones and he picked white ones, [or to pick] white ones and he picked black ones, R’ Eliezer holds [him] liable to a chatas, and R’ Yehoshua exempts [him]. [But] said R’ Yehudah: I am amazed that R’ Yehoshua exempts [him] in this case. If so, why is it stated (Lev. 4:23): In which he sinned? This is to exclude an unwitting act.