[If] one severed the esophagus and tore the trachea, or he severed the trachea and tore the esophagus, or he severed one of them and waited until [the animal] died, or he thrust the knife under the second [organ] and cut it — R’ Yesheivav says: It is neveilah. R’ Akiva says: It is treifah. R’ Yesheivav stated a general rule in the name of R’ Yehoshua: Whatever became unfit through its slaughtering is neveilah. Whatever was slaughtered properly, but something else caused it to become unfit, is treifah. R’ Akiva admitted to him.

[If] one slaughters an animal, a beast, or a bird, and no blood came out of them, they are kosher, and they may be eaten with ritually contaminated hands, since they have not been made susceptible by blood. R’ Shimon says: They have been made susceptible by the slaughtering.

[If] one slaughters a dying animal, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: [It is not valid] unless it jerks a foreleg and a hind leg. R’ Eliezer says: It suffices if it spurts forth [blood]. Said R’ Shimon: Also one who slaughters at night and rises early the next day and finds the walls full of blood, it is valid, because it spurted [blood], which is in accordance with R’ Eliezer’s opinion. The Sages, however, say: [It is not valid] unless it jerks a foreleg or a hind leg, or unless it wiggles its tail. The same rule applies both to small animals and to large animals. A small animal that stretched out its foreleg but did not draw [it] back, it is invalid, because it is only an indication of the expiration of life. When does this apply? [If] it was presumed to be dying, but if it was presumed to be healthy, even if it has none of these signs, it is valid.

[If] one slaughters for a gentile, his slaughtering is valid, but R’ Eliezer declares it invalid. Said R’ Eliezer: Even if he slaughtered it so that the gentile should eat from its diaphragm, it is invalid, because the unexpressed intent of a gentile is [presumed to be] for idolatry. Said R’ Yose: The matter can be proven by an a fortiori reasoning: If in the place where the intent renders it invalid, [viz.,] in the case of sacrificial animals, everything depends solely on the one who performs the service, a place where intent does not render invalid, [viz.,] in the case of nonsacrificial animals, is it not logical that all should depend solely upon the slaughterer?