In what manner is the part which makes it permissible not [considered to have been] offered as required? [If] he performed kemitzah [with intent for] outside its area, but he placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], or burnt [it on the Altar for] beyond its time; or he performed kemitzah [for] beyond its time, but he placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], and burnt [it] outside its place; or he performed kemitzah, placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], or burnt [it for] outside its area; [or] the sinner’s minchah-offering or jealousy minchah-offering whose kemitzah he performed for a designation other than its own, and placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], and burnt [it on the Altar for] beyond its time; [or] he performed kemitzah [for] beyond its time, and placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], and burnt [it on the Altar] for a designation other than its own; or he performed kemitzah, placed [the kometz] in a vessel, conveyed [it], and burnt [it on the Altar] for a designation other than its own; these are [cases in which] the part which makes it permissible was not offered as required. [If he intended] to eat an olive’s volume outside and an olive’s volume tomorrow; [or] an olive’s volume tomorrow and an olive’s volume outside; [or] half an olive’s volume outside and half an olive’s volume tomorrow; [or] half an olive’s volume tomorrow and half an olive’s volume outside — it is invalid, but it carries no kares [penalty]. Said R’ Yehudah: This is the rule: If the intent of time preceded the intent of place, [it is] piggul and one is liable to kares over it; but if the intent of the place preceded the intent of time, it is invalid, but carries no kares [penalty]. However, the Sages say: In either case it is invalid, but it carries no kares [penalty]. [If he intended] to eat half an olive’s volume and to burn half an olive’s volume [on the Altar], it is valid — because eating and Altar-burning cannot be combined. 

[If] one performs kemitzah on a minchahoffering [intending] to eat its remainder or to burn its kometz tomorrow — R’ Yose agrees in this case that it is piggul and that one is liable to kares over it. [If his intention was] to burn its frankincense tomorrow — R’ Yose says: It is invalid, but it carries no kares [penalty]; but the Sages say: [It is] piggul and one is liable to kares over it. They said to him: How is this different from an animal sacrifice? He said to them: Because [with] an animal sacrifice the blood, meat, and sacrificial parts are one, whereas the frankincense is not from the minchah-offering.

[If] he slaughtered [the] two lambs [intending] to eat one of the loaves tomorrow; [or] he burnt the two spoonfuls [of frankincense intending] to eat one of the arrangements tomorrow — R’ Yose says: That loaf or that arrangement about which he [expressed his] intention is piggul, and one is liable to kares over it; and the second one is invalid but carries no [penalty of] kares. But the Sages say: Both are piggul, and one is liable to kares over them. [If] one of the loaves or one of the arrangements became tamei — R’ Yehudah says: They should both go out to the place of burning, because a communal offering is not divisible; but the Sages say: The one which is tamei [remains] in its [state of] tumah, but the one which is tahor is eaten.

The todah-offering renders the bread piggul, but the bread does not render the todahoffering piggul. How so? [If] one slaughters the todah-offering [intending] to eat from it tomorrow, [both] it and the bread become piggul. [However, if he intended] to eat from the bread tomorrow, the bread becomes piggul, but the todah-offering does not become piggul. The lambs render the bread piggul, but the bread does not render the lambs piggul. How so? [If] one slaughters the lambs [intending] to eat from them tomorrow, [both] they and the bread become piggul. [However, if he intended] to eat from the bread tomorrow, the bread becomes piggul, but the lambs do not become piggul.